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Abstract 
Previous research has credited China’s top leaders, Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao, with the 
social policies of their decade in power, arguing that they promoted these policies either 
for factional reasons or to achieve rational, problem-solving goals. But such arguments 
ignore the dominant “fragmented authoritarian” model of policy making in China that 
centres on bargaining among bureaucratic agencies. This paper asks whether top 
leadership factions, rational problem solving, or “fragmented authoritarianism” can 
explain the adoption of one of the Hu and Wen administration’s flagship policies, New 
Rural Cooperative Medical Schemes. Based on a careful tracing of this policy’s evolution, 
it finds little evidence for these explanations, and instead uncovers the role played by 
international events and organizations, and ideas they introduced or sustained within 
policy networks. The paper highlights some of the effects that China’s international 
engagement has had on policy making and the need to go beyond explanations of the 
policy process that focus solely on domestic actors. It proposes a new model of policy 
making, “network authoritarianism,” that centres on policy networks spanning the 
domestic—international, state—non-state, and central—local divides, and which takes 
account of the influence of ideas circulating within these networks.  
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Introduction 
The tendency to credit Hu Jintao 胡锦涛 and Wen Jiabao 温家宝 with the social policies 
of their decade in power is in part a convenient shorthand. But while it is unlikely that 
major policies would have been adopted or implemented nationwide had China’s top 
leaders opposed them, accounts that focus exclusively on Hu and Wen perpetuate an 
understanding of policy making as straightforwardly controlled, top-down, by those at 
the very apex of the political system. Such accounts have their roots in the politics and 
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scholarship of the pre-reform “Maoist” period,1 when a combination of Mao Zedong’s 
毛泽东 penchant for playing a direct role in policy making, and limited access to China by 
foreign scholars, resulted in a concentration on his part in driving many policies. Variants 
of this understanding of Mao era policy making focussed on factional power politics 
among the Chinese leadership or portrayed policy as the product of leaders’ rational, 
problem-solving calculations.2 
 
Challenging top leader-centred explanations are those that have focussed on bureaucratic 
actors. Early studies of the bureaucracy and of political organization,3 when combined 
with greater access to China from the late 1970s, evolved into influential work that in the 
late 1980s characterized policy making as shaped by “fragmented authoritarianism”.4 This 
characterization emphasizes the decisive roles of bureaucratic actors and institutional 
arrangements (systems of rank, functional divisions of authority, and decentralization) 
and portrays intra-bureaucratic bargaining as important in shaping policy. Based on a 
study of economic decision making and large-scale energy policies that were important 
not only to some of China’s top leaders but also to certain provincial governments and 
ministries, the model might work less well for other policy areas.5 But there have been 
few formal or detailed attempts to test it in other policy arenas.6 Instead, it has remained 
the dominant model of policy making,7 and has been modified since the early 1990s only 
to take account of the influence of domestic “policy entrepreneurs” – whether individual 
officials, journalists, editors or non-governmental organizations – who are portrayed as 
taking advantage of the spaces created by institutional fragmentation. In studies ranging 
across environmental, trade, housing and anti-poverty policies, these studies show how 
domestic actors have used their knowledge of bureaucratic structures and ways of 
working to promote their own interests or policy agendas.8  
 
This paper assesses the utility of “fragmented authoritarianism” and its key rivals, the 
leadership power and rationality models of policy making, through a study of a major 
                                                
1 Influential studies include MacFarquhar 1974 and Pye 1981. 
2 Barnett 1974; Harding 1981; Solinger 1984. I draw here on Lieberthal and Oksenberg’s 1988 
characterization of the literature, which they discuss in detail.  
3 Barnett 1967; Schurmann 1968. 
4 Lampton 1987; Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988; Lieberthal and Lampton 1992. 
5 Kenneth Lieberthal himself has argued this. See Lieberthal 1992. 
6 For exceptions see Lieberthal and Lampton 2002. 
7 I use the term “model” loosely here and elsewhere in the paper, as does Lieberthal (1992), to refer to a 
characterization of institutions shaping policy making rather than to a formal model. 
8 Zhu 2008; Mertha 2009; Hammond 2013. 
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domestic social (and health9) policy often credited to the Hu—Wen leadership – “New 
Rural Cooperative Medical Schemes” (NRCMS). It looks at all three models because 
although fragmented authoritarianism still dominates scholarship on Chinese public 
policy, leadership power and rational explanations are common in both scholarly and 
media accounts of Chinese politics and policy making – and, as we shall see, have been 
used to explain China’s 21st century social policies, including NRCMS.  
 
The paper focuses on NRCMS case for several reasons. It was an early policy (trialled 
from 2003 and implemented nationwide from 2005) of the Hu—Wen period, and it was 
closely related to the major initiative to “Build a new socialist countryside” (announced in 
early 2006). It was important because it not only aimed to provide health insurance to all 
rural residents, but also rolled out for the first time in the post-Mao period (partially) 
government-funded universal rural social programme. It was then followed by others, 
most notably means-tested income support and pensions for rural dwellers. But it was 
with NRCMS that the Party-state for the first time established the entitlement of this 
previously marginalized (though numerically significant) segment of the population to 
government-funded social provision.  
 
Using NRCMS as a single case to test explanations of policy making has both advantages 
and limitations. It allows this paper to present more detail, but it also means that its 
findings need further testing in other cases. NRCMS is a “hard” case for a test of 
leadership power explanations due its strong association with Hu Jintao (usually 
portrayed as in the opposing faction to his predecessor, Jiang Zemin 江泽民) and Wen 
Jiabao. It is also a hard case against which to test the “rational” explanation, given that it 
aimed to address a particular social problem. But it is a “soft” case for testing the 
bureaucratic bargaining explanation, since it does not (like economic or energy policy) 
involve competition over significant assets or resources. The paper therefore presents a 
potentially stronger challenge to factional and rational models, but it cannot 
fundamentally challenge bureaucratic bargaining models that may work well in policy 
arenas that (unlike NRCMS) generate greater intra-bureaucratic competition. Its own 
propositions about international influences and policy networks must also be tested 
through examination of other cases.   
 
                                                
9 I take health policies to fall within the wider “social policy” category.  
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Methodologically, the paper draws on recent attempts in political science to strengthen 
qualitative case study analysis by using process tracing to evaluate competing 
hypotheses.10 It uses previous explanations of the adoption of NRCMS to establish 
hypotheses,11 but it identifies others from a combination of prior theoretical knowledge 
and detailed understanding of the case. The analysis proceeded as follows. I first traced 
the evolution of the policy from its beginnings in the 1980s through to the mid-2000s 
(when it was rolled out nationwide) using party and government policy documents, the 
reports of international organizations, Chinese newspaper articles and scholarly papers. 
Having drawn up a policy timeline (for a greatly simplified version see the Appendix to 
this paper), I identified key decision points in the policy’s evolution, and the actors 
involved around those decision points. I was also able to identify changes to the policy’s 
content (for example the shift from township to county level administration, and from 
individual to combined individual-and-government funding) and to the official rationale 
for the policy.  
 
Using this timeline, I evaluated prior explanations and identified new actors and 
influences on the policy so as to generate a new explanation of its development and a 
new model of policy making. In so doing I was alert to the potential influence of factors 
identified in policy research elsewhere, particularly those relating to policy networks and 
the influence of ideas in policy making.12 These factors and concepts are rarely deployed 
analytically in Chinese policy research.13  
 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. It first gives an overview of key events in the 
evolution of what became NRCMS. It then elaborates the three dominant models of 
policy making in China and their actual or hypothetical competing explanations of 
NRCMS.14 The paper then assesses the evidence for these explanations, before setting 
out an alternative that highlights international influences – organizations operating within 
policy networks and their ideas, as well as international events and interpretations of 
                                                
10 Van Evera 1997; Bennett 2010; Collier 2011. 
11 In the rest of this paper, I refer to “explanations” rather than discussing hypotheses in formal terms. 
This is done to save space and to make the paper more readable. My “dependent variable” is the decision 
(actually, a sequence of decisions, as we shall see) to adopt NRCMS and implement it nationwide. 
12 In this I was influenced by Hall 1993; Béland 2009; John 2012. 
13 Though some have discussed ideas (see Li 2017), while others and have identified domestic policy 
networks in China (see most notably Zhao 2010, Zhu 2013), they have not used them to develop a model 
of policy making as I do below. 
14 I refer to “explanations” here and below, rather than formally transforming explanations into 
hypotheses. This is done primarily to save space and make the paper more readable. 
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them. The paper concludes by discussing the changing significance of international 
influences over time and proposes a new model of the policy process – network 
authoritarianism. 
 
New Rural Cooperative Medical Schemes: a brief timeline 
New Rural Cooperative Medical Schemes (xinxing nongcun hezuo yiliao 新型农村合作医疗) 
were adopted as national policy and implemented nationwide in the first decade of the 
21st century. But they can be traced back to Rural Cooperative Medical Schemes (RCMS, 
nongcun hezuo yiliao 农村合作医疗) adopted from the late 1950s and extended during the 
Cultural Revolution to around 80 per cent of villages.15 These schemes were, however, 
allowed to collapse in the early 1980s, so that by 1984 they existed in only about five per 
cent of villages.16  
 
From 1985, the Chinese Ministry of Health, with advice and support from the World 
Bank and the Rand Corporation, began exploratory experiments with commercial 
insurance alternatives to RCMS.17 But by 1991, during a pause in pro-market reforms 
following the 1989 “Tiananmen” protests and crackdown, RCMS emerged as the 
preferred policy – backed by Li Peng 李鹏 and the Ministry of Health.18 In the early 1990s, 
Ministry of Health-led experiments with RCMS began, and in January 1997 the Party 
Central Committee and State Council issued an authoritative “Decision” (jueding 决
定)that announced nationwide voluntary RCMS experiments and the goal of extending 
schemes to all rural residents by 2000.19  
 
With only a few exceptions, however, localities failed to implement experiments in the 
late 1990s because the Party-state centre simultaneously pushed forward tax-for-fee 
reforms aimed at reducing unpopular local government levies that were said to be 
creating unreasonable burdens for farmers.20 The centre then issued a Notice in July 1998 
that made clear local governments should not gather fees (which included RCMS 
                                                
15 Lampton 1977.  
16 Duckett 2011a, 6. 
17 Sine 1994; Wang 2009. 
18 Müller 2016.  
19 Party Central Committee & State Council 1997. The RCMS model did not include any government 
funding, so that revenues were to be generated only by villager contributions. 
20 The Party had been monitoring rural protests that it understood to be linked to the “farmers’ burden” 
caused by taxes and local government fee-charging. See Duckett and Wang 2017. The centre issued a 
Decision on reducing these burdens on 30 December 1996, two weeks before the January 1997 Decision 
on health reform. See Party Central Committee and State Council 1996. 
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contributions).21 RCMS was quietly dropped until May 2001 when it once again appeared 
in “Guiding opinions on rural health work” drawn up by the State Council Economic 
System Reform Office, State Planning Commission and Ministries of Finance, 
Agriculture and Health.22  
 
In January 2002, nine months before Jiang Zemin 江泽民 stepped down as General 
Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and Hu Jintao took over that role, 
Vice-premier Li Lanqing 李岚清 ordered the formulation of rural health reform policies 
including rural health protection. This led to an October 2002 Party Central Committee 
and State Council Decision announcing rural health reforms and “new” RCMS (NRCMS) 
just before Hu Jintao took leadership of the CCP.23 NRCMS differed from RCMS (in 
1997) in two key ways: first, it was organized by county governments, rather than by 
townships; second, it involved government funding alongside voluntary farmer 
contributions.24  
 
The 2002 Party-state Decision, unlike its 1997 predecessor, was soon followed by 
“Opinions” to push the implementation of local experiments. In January 2003, two 
months before Wen Jiabao became Premier, the State Council ordered each provincial 
level government to select two or three counties to pilot NRCMS,25 and then ordered the 
creation of NRCMS coordinating committees.26 Experiments began that year, and were 
then extended. In September 2005, the Party-state centre reviewed the experiments at a 
National NRCMS Pilot Work Conference and announced the goal of adopting the 
programme nationwide by 2008, ahead of the original schedule of 2010.27 By 2008 
NRCMS had extended a measure of health risk protection to almost all the rural 
population. 
                                                
21 Party Central Committee Office and State Council Office 1998.  
22 State Council Economic System Reform Office, State Planning Commission, Ministry of Finance, 
Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of Health 2001. This document refers to the 1997 Party Central 
Committee and State Council Decision on health reform. It encourages RCMS but stresses the need to 
accord with local circumstances and is vague on the government role.  
23 Party Central Committee & State Council 2002.  
24 Ibid. Initial local government contributions were 10 yuan per person and the Centre was to contribute 10 
yuan per person in central and western parts of the country (Party Central Committee and State Council 
2002). 
25 The State Council circulated the “Opinions of the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Finance and the 
Ministry of Agriculture on Setting up the New Rural Cooperative Medical System.” These NRCMS 
Opinions had been prepared alongside the 2002 Decision and elaborated the policy’s key elements.  
26 It set up an Inter-Ministry NRCMS Liaison Office, chaired by Vice-premier Wu Yi. See Wang 2009; 
Manuel 2015. 
27 Wang 2009, 395—96. 
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Explaining the adoption of NRCMS 
Leaders and factional power explanations 
Factional explanations have typically argued that a policy is adopted by one group of 
leaders “to rebuff a challenge from rivals”, or by a faction “for the rewards it bestows 
upon its network of loyalists”.28 Such explanations were found in work on major policy 
shifts from the 1970s through into the 1980s,29 but they have become much less 
common in policy analyses since then.30 And when factions – notably the Shanghai 
Clique, “Youth League” faction, and “Princelings” – are mentioned, they are portrayed as 
more fluid than in the Mao and early post-Mao periods.31  
 
Although factional power rivalries have not been used to explain the adoption of 
NRCMS in 2002, factions have been mentioned in connection with the social policies of 
the 2000s that include NRCMS. Shaun Breslin has argued, for example, that Hu’s social 
policies marked a distinct shift by the “Youth League” faction toward tackling inequality 
and deprivation and away from the economic growth-focussed policies of Jiang Zemin 
and the Shanghai clique.32 Cheng Li, meanwhile, has argued that Hu Jintao’s lack of 
factional support in the top echelons of the CCP motivated him to use social policies to 
generate popular support.33 Neither, however, provides evidence for his claim. 
 
In fact, factional power plays do not provide a satisfactory explanation of the adoption 
and extension of NRCMS in the early 2000s under Jiang Zemin and then Hu Jintao. 
Jiang Zemin is usually associated in factional analyses with the Shanghai Clique, and his 
successor as President and CCP General Secretary, Hu Jintao, with the rival Youth 
League faction. Yet, Jiang backed RCMS in 1996 and then revived it in 2001. He (and 
Premier Li Peng) attended a national health conference in December 1996 at which he 
spoke in support of RCMS.34 Jiang has also been specifically linked to putting it back on 
the central government agenda in late 2001.35 NRCMS policy was then formulated under 
his leadership from January 2002 and adopted in October that year, just before the 16th 
                                                
28 Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988, 3. 
29 Ibid, 14—16.  
30 Exceptions are Li 2005, and Shih 2007. 
31 Miller 2015; Teiwes 2015. 
32 Breslin 2008. 
33 Li 2005. 
34 Xia 2003.  
35 Liu and Rao (2006, 83—5) provide a detailed account. 
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Party Congress in November at which Jiang stepped down and Hu took power. 
Measures to implement and extend the policy were sustained under Hu into 2003 and 
beyond. 
 
Leaders and rational explanations 
“Rational” explanations portray policies as responses to objectively existing economic, 
social or political problems. In some variants, the decision makers are simply “policy 
makers” or “the government”, and their motives are not explored. Such explanations are 
often implicit in studies that describe rather than analyse policies, and are common in 
work by scholars who focus on improving policy rather than analysing how it is made. In 
other variants, top leaders adopt policies “pragmatically to solve new policy problems” or 
in order “to keep alive [their] ideological vision”.36 Work making these arguments often 
focuses on leaders and their values and preferences.37 Others consider their background 
and experience. The economic growth-focussed policies of the Jiang and Zhu period are 
thus sometimes linked to their urban, coastal leadership experience, while Hu and Wen’s 
focus on rural social policy is portrayed a result of their background in poor rural areas 
and agricultural affairs.  
 
Rational explanations are evident in accounts of NRCMS – particularly those that are 
concerned more with its outcomes than with why it was adopted.38 But others interested 
in explaining the evolution of RCMS and eventual adoption of NRCMS have also 
sometimes used them. Chief among them is Wang Shaoguang, who has argued that the 
Ministry of Health and then central government policy makers “learned” from research 
and policy experimentation first that RCMS was better than user-pay systems. Top policy 
makers then learned from further experimentation that cooperative schemes needed 
government funding to make them work, and they agreed to such funding after fiscal 
revenues grew in the early 2000s.39 Thus the government is portrayed as dealing with a 
social problem once it has right policy and the finance to do so.  
 
Wang’s study provides a fascinating account of the evolution of RCMS experiments, and 
it argues persuasively that the central government’s improving fiscal situation was 
                                                
36 Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988, 3. 
37 Ibid., 11—13, citing Barnett 1974, Harding 1981 and Solinger 1984.  
38 For example, Wagstaff et al. 2009; Babiarz et al. 2010.  
39 Wang 2009.  
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conducive for implementing government-subsidized NRCMS. But fiscal revenues rose as 
a share of gross domestic product from 1997 onwards, and leaders could have chosen to 
spend on any number of projects and policies.  Fiscal capacity is therefore an important 
contextual variable, but it does not explain why a decision was taken in 2002 (rather than 
earlier or later) to adopt NRCMS, and why it was prioritized over other policies (such as 
rural pensions).40 While Wang demonstrates the Chinese governance system’s 
extraordinary capacity for experimentation, research and extensive discussion of some 
policy options, his account also tends to idealize that process – as if the adopted policy is 
the correct one, when as others have argued, some aspects of NRCMS were flawed: its 
focus on catastrophic, inpatient care, and its limited funding compared with urban 
programmes.41 
 
Bureaucrats, policy entrepreneurs and fragmented authoritarian explanations 
The “fragmented authoritarian” portrayal of policy making directed attention in the late 
1980s to bureaucratic actors and institutions as an important corrective to studies that 
had focussed on leaders.42 This sophisticated work revealed how policy outcomes were 
strongly influenced by bargaining among competing bureaucratic agencies – including 
central ministries and provincial governments. It showed that the system of bureaucratic 
rank meant that when agencies of the same rank disagreed on an issue or policy, it would 
be passed upward to top leaders to coordinate, mediate or adjudicate. As a result, it 
argued, policy processes were “diffuse”, “protracted”, “incremental” and “disjointed.”43  
 
Although fragmented authoritarianism and bureaucratic bargaining has not been 
explicitly invoked to explain the making of RCMS or NRCMS policy in the 1990s and 
2000s, some accounts do focus on bureaucratic actors. Armin Müller, for example, 
characterizes the development of NCRMS as shaped by bureaucratic actors taking 
competing pro-government (in favour of state-funded CMS) and pro-market (in favour 
of commercial insurance) positions.44 His focus is on key central government agencies 
that tended to favour one position or the other – the Ministry of Health in favour of 
CMS, for example, and the Ministries of Agriculture and Finance in favour of 
                                                
40 Wang gives no detail of events at the critical decision-making juncture of 2002, when RCMS/NRCMS 
came back onto the agenda. 
41 Ryan Manuel (2016) also makes this point – that the problems of earlier models remain in the model that 
is adopted. 
42 Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988, 16—17. 
43 Ibid., 24—27. 
44 Müller 2016. 
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commercial health insurance. Müller portrays these bureaucratic positions as based on 
institutional perspectives – the Ministry of Agriculture wanting to reduce farmers’ 
burdens and so against compulsory farmer contributions to CMS, the Ministry of 
Finance against large budgetary commitments – but also sometimes influenced by 
Ministers’ alliances with other leaders. 
 
Bureaucratic actors certainly were important. The Ministry of Health was charged with 
RCMS work from the 1980s through to the late 1990s, leading experimental studies and 
formulating RCMS policy documents. The State Council Economic System Reform 
Office (ESRO) and its drafting group in 2002 coordinated NRCMS policy formulation 
and negotiation.45 Policy documents setting out both RCMS and NRCMS policy were 
often issued under the joint names of several ministries, including the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Ministry of Finance, indicating that they had been involved in producing 
them.46 
 
There is also some evidence of bureaucratic bargaining over the details of RCMS and 
NRCMS. In both programmes, farmers contributions were stipulated to be voluntary as a 
concession to the Ministry of Agriculture, because mandatory contributions would have 
undermined that Ministry’s efforts to reduce local government fees and the “farmers’ 
burden”.47 In addition, the ESRO’s drafting group – consisting of representatives of the 
Ministries of Health, Agriculture and Finance – provided a forum for bargaining, and the 
2002 Decision on Rural Health Reform reportedly went through thirty drafts over nine 
months.48 Although we do not have details of the drafting group’s negotiations, the 
Ministry of Finance will have been involved in setting the level of fiscal support for the 
programme. This support was obtained (on 9 October 2002 at a State Council meeting 
chaired by Zhu Rongji49), but the relatively low per capita fiscal spending on the 
programme will have been determined in this process.50 
                                                
45 The ESRO had been given responsibility for rural health work in November 2001 according to Liu and 
Rao (2006), though it had also led production of the “Guiding Opinions on Rural Health Reform and 
Development”, promulgated on 24 May 2001 (Ministry of Health 2003, 3).  
46 E.g. State Council Economic System Reform Office et al. 2001. 
47 Müller (2016) details the Ministry of Agriculture’s position on the farmers’ burden and argues that the 
Ministry of Finance and Planning Commission in 1993 withdrew financial support for CMS – at a time 
when the fiscal system was seen to be in crisis – and so intergovernmental transfers to support CMS were 
taken off the table. 
48 Ministry of Health 2003, 3—4. 
49 Ibid.  
50 The initial central government funding commitment was ten yuan per rural dweller (per year) 
participating in the programme in Western provinces. 
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At the same time, however, the RCMS and NRCMS case shows the limits of bureaucratic 
bargaining explanations. First, the Ministry of Health developed RCMS (involving 
villager contributions) at the same time as the Ministry of Agriculture developed its rural 
tax-for-fee reform policies that sought to eliminate non-tax “fees” (that would include 
RCMS contributions) on rural dwellers.51 As mentioned above, a Decision to tackle fees 
was approved at the very top of the Party-state in December 1996,52 and the RCMS 
Decision followed in January 1997. Here we see evidence of fragmentation – with 
different ministries pursuing conflicting policies separately, but instead of disagreements 
between ministries being pushed upward for mediation and resolution during policy 
formulation as predicted in the fragmented authoritarian model, initially at least, the Party 
Central Committee and State Council adopted both policies. It was only later that the 
Party-state centre issued a decision prioritizing the reduction of farmers’ burdens and 
forbidding governments to charge (non-tax) fees in the name of the collective, thus 
undermining RCMS.53 
 
Although the making and adoption of RCMS – and ultimately NRCMS – policy was not 
noticeably diffuse (in the sense that a particularly large number of bureaucratic actors was 
involved), it was protracted, incremental and disjointed. Following a decision to pursue 
RCMS in 1991, it evolved slowly and incrementally over the next 17 years: the Ministry 
led experiments from 1993—95, reviewed them in 1996 and the Party Central 
Committee and State Council issued a decision in 1997 that set a target date of 2000 for 
nationwide implementation.54 RCMS then dropped off the policy agenda until 2001. (The 
1998—2001 hiatus could be seen as a “disjointed” period). It (now NRCMS) was then 
pursued again at an accelerated pace, with further experiments and ever-wider 
implementation until it had been adopted nationwide by 2008.55 
 
                                                
51 See also Wang in this special section. 
52 Party Central Committee and State Council 1996. This document specifically said that cooperative 
medical schemes must be voluntary. 
53 Party Central Committee Office and State Council Office 1998. This document did not refer to RCMS. 
But according to Müller (2016), the Ministry of Agriculture had in 1997 drafted a list of illegal rural fees 
that included CMS premium contributions. 
54 Wang 2009; Manuel 2016. 
55 Even now, since then it has been subject to modification and is likely to evolve in the future. 
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International influences  
As we can see from the account above, a critical juncture in the making of NRCMS 
policy occurred in 2001—02, when the Party-state decided again to adopt rural 
cooperative medical schemes. This shift was surprising given the neglect of RCMS since 
1997, and even more so since the “new” version for the first time included governmental 
funding alongside voluntary villager contributions, with central government funding poor 
areas, and wealthier local governments funding their own.  
 
What caused (N)RCMS to rise up the agenda in 2001 and be adopted as policy in 2002? 
As we have seen, neither leadership factional politics, rational policymaking nor 
bureaucratic bargaining have been able explain the policy shift at this time. There was no 
leadership change in 2001 or early 2002. Leaders had known about rural impoverishment 
due to ill health and high medical expenses since the mid-1990s, and the central 
government’s fiscal situation had been improving for several years. A key point of intra-
bureaucratic contention between the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Agriculture 
over contributions and the farmers’ burden remained.56 Nor were bureaucratic actors 
influenced primarily by domestic policy entrepreneurs – the officials, the media or 
domestic NGOs identified in other policy arenas. 
 
I argue below that to explain the 2002 decision to adopt NRCMS, we need to recognize 
the important part played by international influences. This includes international 
organizations, which brought resources and ideas to policy networks they shared with 
domestic bureaucratic actors and researchers. It also includes international events, which 
were interpreted in ways that led domestic policy actors to adjust their overall 
development strategy and the place of RCMS within it. Individual top leaders, accepting 
these ideas, played a role in pushing or supporting the policy at key moments, in turn 
because it fitted (or was presented to them as fitting) their overarching, evolving political 
and economic strategy.  
 
International organizations and policy networks in China 
China signed a memorandum of understanding with the World Health Organization in 
1978 and joined the World Bank in 1980. From that time, the Ministry of Health engaged 
extensively with these two international multilateral institutions as well as having bilateral 
                                                
56 See Wang in this special section. Fees were abolished in 2003. 
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cooperation in the health arena with both governmental agencies and international non-
governmental organizations. Wide-ranging activities – including research projects, 
training courses, lectures and seminars – brought many international health experts to 
China, and foreign study trips took Chinese officials abroad.57 
 
In relation specifically to rural health risk protection, the Ministry of Health partnered 
with a number of international organizations who funded experiments with rural 
insurance in the 1980s and then RCMS in the 1990s. From 1985 through to 1993 the 
Ministry worked together with the Rand Corporation in two counties in Sichuan 
province to explore rural health insurance options.58 This followed a World Bank mission 
in January 1985 aimed at planning a health loan to China, and at a time when the collapse 
of Mao era RCMS was becoming apparent.59 The Rand project was included in a World 
Bank loan in 1986 to experiment with different rural health insurance plans between 
1989 and 1990.60 
 
In the 1990s, after receiving a top-level steer toward CMS rather than commercial 
insurance under Li Peng,61 the Ministry of Health further explored RCMS policy options 
in tandem with the World Health Organization (WHO), the World Bank, the United 
Kingdom government’s Department for International Development (DfID), the 
Rockefeller Foundation, the United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund 
(UNICEF), United Nations Development Programme and the Asian Development Bank 
(ADB).62 From 1993, for example, a seven-year UNICEF project examined options for 
financing health care for the rural poor, while the World Bank’s 1998—2007 Health VIII 
project included rural health financing.63 In 2001, a reportedly influential ADB project for 
the State Development and Planning Commission (SDPC) drew on the UNICEF project 
findings.64 Some of these projects contributed to the regulatory framework of NRCMS as 
adopted from 2002.65 It is important to note, however, that alongside these foreign-
                                                
57 Huang 2015. 
58 Sine 1994; Cai 2009. 
59 Cretin et al. 2006, 2. 
60 Ibid. 
61 I have not been able to find details of this important decision in 1991 and so cannot evaluate the 
importance of Li Peng’s role relative to those of other actors.  
62 Liu and Rao 2006; Wang 2009, Table 2. 
63 The Health VIII project began in 1998 and ended in 2007. Wagstaff and Yu 2007. 
64 Liu, Rao and Hu 2002. 
65 Müller argues that a “Best Practices Task Force” (which involved WHO, UNDP and Ministry of Health) 
and the ADB project influenced the final regulatory framework of NRCMS in the early 2000s. 
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funded projects were other local experiments that appear to have had no direct 
international involvement.66  
 
This is not to say that international organizations drove policy change. It is difficult to 
discern whether they encouraged projects on rural health protection or whether the 
Ministry of Health took the initiative to solicit funding and technical support. Indeed, 
documented accounts of research projects often indicate that the Ministry of Health and 
other central government agencies invited support for projects to explore RCMS, 
insurance or other schemes. Those involved in the World Bank rural health projects in 
the 1980s for example noted that Ministry officials had “expressed an interest in 
developing a viable health insurance system”.67 And in 1993, the State Council Research 
Office conducted a study of RCMS that concluded the government should support its 
revitalization to help solve the problems of access to primary health care and financial 
risk protection.68 In January 2001, the SDPC commissioned the Asian Development 
Bank to provide technical assistance on possible social security reforms, including rural 
health insurance, for possible inclusion in the 10th Five Year Plan. 
 
Although they may sometimes have supported different models of rural health financing 
and service delivery,69 international organizations’ willingness to consistently fund 
projects helped keep rural health protection generally, and often RCMS specifically, on 
the Ministry of Health and wider central government agenda. The projects that they 
funded (often via the Ministry’s Foreign Loan Office), and to which they contributed 
technical support, repeatedly helped make the case first that that user-pay rural health 
care could not provide equitably and there was a need for either RCMS or health 
insurance. They then argued that RCMS was more viable than commercial insurance, 
would help reduce ill-health induced poverty, and that government investment was 
necessary if RCMS was to provide widespread coverage.70 Their reports and the papers 
that international researchers published often praised Mao era RCMS and encouraged 
                                                
66 As mentioned for example by Wang (2009, 385), though the projects listed in Table 2 all involve 
international partners.  
67 Cretin et al. 2006, p. 2. 
68 Liu, Rao and Hu 2002.  
69 Different international organizations sometimes promoted different models, including for example, 
commercial insurance. Müller (2016) argues that the Ministry of Health in 1990 specifically rejected the 
insurance models that had been explored in the Rand project and opted instead for state-backed CMS. 
70 Wang 2009, 391—2. 
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attempts to reinvigorate or improve on it.71  
 
At the same time, these organizations became embedded in Chinese health policy 
networks and via them into elite personal networks. Their offices in Beijing employed 
both international and local staff and researchers, and through protracted interactions 
(including fieldwork, seminars and conferences), their staff and consultants joined a 
network of actors in the rural health policy arena alongside the Ministry of Health and 
domestic health researchers. This enabled them to advance and discuss options for 
delivering health risk protection to rural dwellers and develop arguments about rural 
impoverishment due to ill health. As an example, the late 1990s UNICEF and 2001 ADB 
projects involved Ministry of Health researchers and the Harvard School of Public 
Health, and the ADB report (commissioned by the SDPC and drawing on the UNICEF 
findings) was sent to the Minister of Health Zhang Wenkang 张文康. This Minister, who 
had worked in the past with Jiang Zemin, communicated the report’s findings to him 
personally, with the result that the CCP Central Committee pursued its findings. Liu and 
Rao link this directly to RCMS moving up the policy agenda in 2001.72  
 
China’s membership of the WHO and World Trade Organization 
International organizations influenced NRCMS policy not only through funding and the 
ideas they brought to the health policy networks in which they were involved. Here the 
examples of the WHO and the World Trade Organization (WTO) are instructive. In 
relation to the WHO, there is evidence that at two points, it (or China’s membership of 
it) encouraged the government to pursue RCMS. First, in 1985 China pledged at the 
WHO’s World Health Assembly to “afford everyone entitlement to basic health care by 
2000”, something that would necessitate a move away from the user-pay medical system 
prevalent at that time and so encouraged the Chinese government to develop rural health 
risk protection.73 In other words, commitments made in this international forum indicate 
the Chinese government accepting international ideas, benchmarks and targets that may 
have helped keep RCMS or an alternative on the policy agenda. Second, and more 
directly, the World Health Organization’s World Health Report in 2000 evaluated and 
ranked health care systems around the world on several different indicators. In terms of 
“fairness in financial contribution”, China’s health care system ranked very low indeed – 
                                                
71 World Bank reports in 1984, 1992 and 1997 all supported CMS and tax funding for it. 
72 Liu and Rao 2006. 
73 Wang 2009, 386. 
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188th out of 191 nations – and primarily because of poor health risk protection 
(insurance-type provisions) in the countryside. Several accounts of RCMS development 
have indicated that this shocked China’s top leaders (not least because RCMS had been 
praised in the past for its achievements) and catalyzed a renewed focus on rural health 
protection that contributed to the adoption of NRCMS in 2002.74  
 
China’s membership of another multilateral institution also played a role in the adoption 
of NRCMS. China joined the WTO in December 2001 after 15 years of negotiations, and 
its accession was portrayed as a major achievement for Jiang Zemin, who had personally 
backed it. But the Chinese leadership was aware that WTO entry was likely to hit 
agriculture (and so farmers) harder than some other sectors of the economy. In August 
and September 2001, a National People’s Congress investigation recommended 
strengthening rural social security to prepare for WTO accession.75 A Party rural work 
conference held in early January 2002 discussed the likely negative impact of WTO entry 
on agriculture and the need to mitigate the effects of WTO entry through a series of rural 
policies, including RCMS.76 Immediately after a rural health work conference in late 
January, Vice-premier Li Lanqing tasked the State Council Office with formulating policy 
documents (Ministry of Health 2003). Following this, through the rest of 2002, Li pushed 
forward rural health work in general, and NRCMS in particular.  
 
International events: the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 and its interpretation 
RCMS policy was also influenced by China’s regional and international economic 
integration and particularly by the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997. The Crisis did not 
directly and immediately affect China’s economy, but by 1998 its effects were being felt 
through harder-hit trading partners in the region. Justin Yifu Lin 林毅夫, a prominent 
Chinese economist (who had studied in the United States), began to argue that China 
should seek to grow domestic demand, especially in rural areas, so as to reduce reliance 
on international markets.77 This interpretation then converged with longstanding 
concerns about low rural incomes and the adverse impact of impending WTO entry.  
The January 2002 rural work conference neatly drew all these issues together before 
                                                
74 Zhang et al. 2014; Müller 2016. 
75 Müller 2016. 
76 Zhu 2002. 
77 Lin 1999. Lin was Chief Economist at the World Bank from 2008—2012. 
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concluding on the importance of rural work, including rural health work, and the need to 
implement RCMS:  
 
“At present, the most prominent problem in agriculture and rural economic development is 
still the difficulty of raising rural incomes…. This year is the first year of our country’s entry 
to the World Trade Organization, and agriculture may receive a quite large shock, [so] 
increasing rural incomes will be even more difficult. Increasing rural incomes not only relates 
to rural economic development, improving rural livelihoods and rural social stability, but also 
relates to implementing the line of expanding domestic demand and to the full picture of 
economic and social development. The whole Party must take this problem very seriously, 
make increasing rural incomes the most important task in agriculture and rural work, and put 
in in a prominent position in all economic work.”78  
 
In the 1990s, arguments for CMS had focussed on how it could help tackle rural poverty 
and well as contribute to rural development and social stability,79 but it was not until rural 
health and poverty were interpreted as holding back wider national economic 
development that they became a priority. The 19 October 2002 document “Concerning 
Strengthening Rural Health Work” that announced plans for NRCMS, similarly argued 
that rural health work “relates to protecting rural production capacity, enlivening the 
rural economy and protecting social development and stability”.80 At the rural health 
conference held in October 2002 further promoting these rural health policies, including 
NRCMS, Li Lanqing quoted Jiang Zemin to link rural health work again to the wider 
goal of economic development:  
 
Comrade Jiang Zemin has pointed out: “Rural health work directly relates to rural 
development, thriving agriculture and rural health, [and] it relates to the achievement of our 
country’s economic and social development targets.”81 
 
Conclusion 
Pinning down the factors shaping policies in China is notoriously difficult,82 and there is 
much about the making of NRCMS policy that remains hidden. Despite this, the analysis 
                                                
78 Zhu 2002. Note the reference to “social stability” in this quotation. There is not the space in this paper 
to discuss at length the extent to which concern with rural instability might have played a role in pushing 
NRCMS up the policy agenda. It was a long-term concern underpinning the Party’s focus on rural incomes 
as well as tax and fee reform but does not explain the timing or content of NRCMS. For more discussion 
see Duckett and Wang 2017. 
79 E.g. Party Central Committee & State Council 1997; State Council 1997. 
80 CPPCC & SC 2002.  
81 Li 2002. 
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above has shown that it is not simply the case that Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao embarked 
on a new rural social policy agenda after they came to power. NRCMS, widely seen as 
their first flagship rural policy, was in fact adopted toward the end of the Jiang—Zhu 
administration in October 2002, while Jiang had supported an earlier variant in 1996. In 
addition, the commitment to funding it and coordinating its implementation was taken 
by January 2003, before the SARS epidemic hit the headlines and before Wen Jiabao 
became Premier. This paper thus reveals policy continuities across administrations where 
others have emphasized discontinuities and seen factional differences.83 
 
Top leaders have nevertheless evidently played an important role in the adoption and 
then implementation of NRCMS. Li Peng supported it in 1990—91, and together with 
Jiang Zemin, backed it in 1996. Vice-premier Li Lanqing pushed it forward in early 2002, 
perhaps at the behest of Jiang, who is reported to have come out in support again from 
2001.84 Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao then supported its implementation after they came to 
power. But at the same time, the NRCMS case shows that it is not always sufficient for a 
top leader – even the Party General Secretary – to back a policy. Although Jiang Zemin 
supported RCMS in 1996, and the CCP Central Committee and State Council Decision 
in 1997 adopted it, the Party centre then apparently retreated, and prioritized rural tax-
for-fee reform instead.  
 
But NRCMS was not simply a rational leadership response to the discovery of a social 
problem. The problem of lack of RCMS coverage had been recognized by the Ministry 
of Health in 1985 and by the Party centre and State Council by 1991, but it took until 
2002 for NRCMS to become sufficiently prioritized to be adopted and government-
funded, and until 2008 for it to be implemented nationwide. As we have seen through 
this study, the top leadership’s agenda was in flux as policy ideas mixed and some rose to 
become prominent issues. NRCMS was adopted and implemented when it appeared to 
contribute to solving several prominent social, political and economic problems – with 
problem-definition partly shaped by international events and ideas.85  
                                                                                                                                       
82 Teiwes 2015. 
83 Another continuity is seen in Wen Jiabao’s role as Vice-premier under Jiang Zemin, though the evidence 
above indicates that it was first Vice-premier Li Lanqing and not Wen, who played a key role in NRCMS in 
2001—02.  
84 Note, however, that as first Vice-premier, Li’s role was to assist Premier Zhu Rongji with State Council 
work, which indicates cooperation and coordination at the top. 
85 We do not speculate on the personal motivations of individual leaders or on how their experiences might 
have influenced their decisions. In China’s political system, there is little (reliable) information on top 
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Institutional arrangements encouraged and supported ministries to produce and 
experiment with policies, but bureaucratic bargaining over resources was not central to 
NRCMS development. Fragmented authoritarian explanations tend to focus on 
bargaining, but we see that only in the final months before the adoption of NRCMS. In 
the 1990s, rather than bargaining, we saw the simultaneous adoption of competing 
policies by the highest levels of the Party-state and then within a year the Party stepping 
in to clarify which policy had priority. The result was a failure to implement NRCMS. We 
do not know exactly what happened behind the scenes at that time but it appears that the 
Party centre prioritized tax-for-fee reforms because it was concerned with rural unrest 
and because as the Asian Financial Crisis hit China it pushed financial probity and fiscal 
prudence up the agenda, perhaps particularly for Zhu Rongji.86 Thus central Party-state 
priorities apparently changed not only due to learning within policy spheres, but also 
under the influence of international events and an evolving development paradigm. 
 
This paper also shows the important role that international organizations have played in 
supporting and encouraging NRCMS. They funded research and policy experiments 
from the mid-1980s through the 21st century that helped establish not only the impact of 
poor health protection on rural poverty but also RCMS’s need for government funding. 
Nevertheless, learning, research and experimentation was insufficient: there was a huge 
amount of this from the late 1980s in relation to RCMS right through into the 21st 
century and yet NRCMS was not adopted until 2002. The ADB/UNICEF research 
finding about the scale of impoverishment due to ill health may have catalyzed Jiang to 
push the policy again from 2001. But it also followed the adoption of a view that overall 
economic development needed stronger domestic demand, the WHO’s critical 2000 
report and the problems that WTO entry was likely to create for farmers. This 
combination of factors brought together health and rural economic considerations. The 
2003 SARS epidemic then most likely consolidated commitment to implementing the 
scheme.87  
                                                                                                                                       
leaders’ personal opinions and ideas. Particularly under Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao, official sources did not 
reveal leaders’ personal policy preferences and instead preferred to maintain a show of collective 
leadership. When we interviewed individual researchers closely involved in NRCMS circles about top 
leaders’ motives, they claimed to have no information.  
86 Zhu had led fiscal reforms in 1994 and there is documentary evidence that he was behind moves to clean 
up rural insurance schemes in the late 1990s. See Duckett and Wang 2017. 
87 Note that NRCMS was not simply a response to the external shock of SARS, as argued by Heilmann 
(2008), because the Decision to adopt it (October 2002) preceded the outbreak (early 2003). 
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International influences on China’s social policies were not exercised, as in many 
developing countries, through “conditionality” – loans tied to certain conditions. Instead, 
they were the result of a more subtle process involving ideational influence that was 
mediated by Chinese Party-state agencies and the officials within them.88 This goes 
beyond the impact of socializing influences of multilateral institutions on China’s foreign 
policy decisions and its adoption of international policies and practices.89 It indicates that 
China’s post-Mao international integration and participation in international 
organizations have profoundly influenced domestic policy.90 Influential actors within the 
Chinese Party-state have not only absorbed pro-market economic ideas from outside,91 
and bought into the GDP growth, consumption-led, globalization model, 92 they have 
also accepted social policy ideas, including concepts of social development and health-
related equity.  
International factors have not yet been incorporated into models of policy making in 
China no doubt due to the difficulties pinning down the influence of ideas as well as the 
justifiable tendency in analyses of authoritarian political systems to focus on state actors 
and their power plays. But – even for all their recurring concern about bourgeois 
liberalization and the potentially negative impacts of “western” thinking – Chinese Party-
state agencies have been keen to search abroad for policy ideas. An examination of these 
ideas in Chinese policy making – including how international ideas are introduced, evolve 
and shape within policy networks in China – is therefore long overdue. At the same time, 
more research is needed on the mutual influence of ideas introduced by international 
actors and those of Chinese domestic actors in policy networks – this is after all surely a 
two-way process. And more research is needed on when and why international ideas are 
sometimes rejected or taken as negative examples.93 
 
                                                
88 I thank one of the external reviewers for this point. For a discussion see Huang 2015.  
89 Pearson 1999; Kent 1999, 2013; Johnston 2008; Huang 2015. This work has been more interested in 
China’s compliance with global governance norms than policy influences. 
90 Huang (2015) has shown the influence of the WHO, World Bank and Global Fund to Fight AIDS, 
Tuberculosis and Malaria on public health policies in China, arguing that these organizations are very 
strongly influential where for China the “negative externalities” are “significant”. He notes that otherwise – 
as this paper shows – domestic politics may play a major role, but does not elaborate on those politics.  
91 Harold Jacobsen and Michel Oksenberg (1990, 143—144, cited by Huang 2015), for example, have 
argued that China’s participation in international economic institutions helped disseminate Ricardian 
economic concepts. 
92 Duckett 2011b. 
93 See for example Teets 2013. 
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Having shown the limitations of existing models of policy making in China, this paper 
proposes a new one – “Network Authoritarianism”. Rather than limiting itself to leaders 
or bureaucratic agencies as the key actors in policy change, this model makes space for 
many different actors, and sees them as interacting in policy (and personal guanxi 关系) 
networks that allow ideas to be introduced, exchanged and developed. These networks 
span the state—non-state (civil society) boundary as well as the central—local and 
national—international divides, and they may overlap.94 While state actors still play an 
important role in formulating policy documents, and in making decisions (the 
“authoritarian” element of the model), they can nevertheless be subtly, but often 
fundamentally, influenced by the ideas of other network participants with whom they 
interact. 
 
As with previous work on policymaking, Network Authoritarianism identifies novel 
features of a picture containing many actors and their complex interactions.95 It seeks not 
only to highlight new actors but also to characterize better than previous models their 
interactions. Network Authoritarianism differs from Fragmented Authoritarianism 
because it emphasizes not the institutions that divide and segment bureaucratic actors 
(though of course these exist), but the informal as well as formal networks that form 
bonds between them. It differs from “FA 2.0” because it sees actors (international as well 
as domestic) outside the state bureaucracy not as simply finding spaces in the interstices 
of a fragmented polity, but as sometimes influential constituents of policy networks.96 It 
also differs from “Consultative Authoritarianism”, with its focus on the Party-state’s 
domination of the policy process and its creation of channels to solicit policy feedback, 
because it sees Party-state actors as subject to influence – sometimes over the definition 
and identification of problems as well as over policy solutions.97 
 
The Network Authoritarian model of policy making in China has been developed from 
research on only one social policy. The extent of international (as well as domestic civil 
society) participation and influence in policy networks will vary between policies and 
                                                
94 While this paper has not discussed the central—local relationships involved in experimentation with 
(N)RCMS policy, it is clear from other work on policy experimentation that policy and personal networks 
can play a role in facilitating experimentation (see Heilmann 2008).  
95 See also Harding 1981; Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988, 10—11. 
96 Of course, not all actors in a policy network have equal power – with the balance of influence likely to 
vary from one policy network to another and over time. 
97 He Baogang and Stig Thøgersen (2010) have used the term to describe the state’s creation of policy 
consultation channels, but not to characterize policy making or explain policies. Jessica Teets (2013) uses 
the term for a model of the state and civil society relationship, rather than as a model of policy making.  
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policy areas, but is unlikely to be confined to this policy alone. Whether – or to what 
extent – the interaction with international actors in social policy extends to other 
domestic policies, awaits further study. But clearly many of the international actors 
referred to in this paper – the World Bank and UNICEF, for example – have been active 
in China not only in this policy arena, but also in many others.  
 
Finally, we need also to pay attention to changes in Chinese policy making over time. 
Fragmented Authoritarianism re-focussed attention on bureaucratic actors at a time – the 
early post-Mao era – when individual leaders’ power was a little less evident, the state 
bureaucracy had been rebuilt after the Cultural Revolution, and China’s international 
engagement beyond the Communist block had only just begun. This paper examines 
most closely the period just after that, from the 1990s through to 2002. It is possible 
therefore that it does not uncover factors neglected by earlier work but instead reveals 
changes to policy making that took place in the 1990s. The turn of the 21st century, when 
China joined the WTO, was a key moment in China’s deepening involvement in the 
international economy and world order. Jiang Zemin had made it a personal goal to 
secure China’s entry as a defining achievement of his administration and so its influence 
was likely to be particularly strong at that point. China’s economic integration has 
deepened significantly since the early 2000s and so international influence is likely to 
have continued to shape policymaking. But Xi Jinping has become more personally 
powerful in a range of policy areas, and there has been since 2015 push-back against the 
influence of “Western” ideas in some spheres. We thus need to ask whether (and how) 
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Appendix: Timeline of (N)RCMS Policy Decisions 
1985  Health protection for all (WHO), and experiments in rural health insurance with 
Rand and World Bank. 
1997  Party-state Decision on RCMS (not implemented). 
2002  Decision on ‘new’ RCMS. 
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